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The Fed’s monetary policies since 2008 have undermined the
creation of a growth-producing economic environment.
In June, much to the consternation of financial markets, the Chairman of the
Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, warned that the current program of
Quantitative Easing (QE) would likely to come to an end in 2014. But has this
measure been effective in stimulating recovery? Looking at QE’s record,
Steven Horwitz argues that by paying a small amount of interest on reserve
balances, the Fed has discouraged banks from lending, leading to a de facto
bailout program.  Now, the Fed faces the very real problem of how to avoid
inflation as QE ends and recovery begins. 
With the US economy experiencing an extremely slow recovery f rom the recession of  2007-
09, debates over the role of  monetary policy have come to the f oref ront, especially given
the variety of  new powers and unorthodox strategies that the Federal Reserve has adopted
in the last f ew years.  Despite its continued attempt to stimulate aggregate demand with
additions to bank reserves designed to keep interest rates low, the ongoing attempts at
expansion have yet to produce much of  a recovery.
One reason f or the inef f ectiveness of  the injection of  reserves is that almost immediately
af ter the onset of  the crisis, the Fed decided to begin to pay a small amount of  interest on the reserve
balances that banks keep there.  The most obvious explanation f or the Fed’s decision to do so is that as
long as that rate is above the yield on saf e assets, it will have a contractionary ef f ect on the money supply
by encouraging banks to hold rather than lend their reserves.
Restricting bank lending this way was
almost certainly the rationale f or this
policy change because it occurred
simultaneously with the Fed injecting capital into f ailing banks.  Those capital injections were not only in
violation of  the long-standing central bank principle of  “lend to good banks at penalty rates” during a crisis,
they also ran the risk of  ignit ing inf lation.  Interest on reserves helped of f set that threat by encouraging
banks to sit on the new reserves. The conjunction of  these two policies also suggests that the clear
purpose of  those capital injections was about bank solvency not bank liquidity.  That is, the point was to
rescue f ailing banks, not to expand the money supply per se.  If  the goal were the latter, why of f set the
capital injections with interest payments on the reserves they created?
A litt le bit later, in the f all of  2008, came the start of  “quantitative easing,” or the large-scale purchase of
f inancial assets, of ten at longer terms than standard expansionary policy.  Quantitative easing has been
adopted in countries where short term interest rates have f allen to near zero and where clearing junky
assets of f  bank balance sheets was seen as a worthy goal.  The hope is that by increasing the quantity of
reserves, the policy will lead to lending and spark growth, of ten by bringing down longer term interest rates. 
However, this depends on banks having viable lending options in a low interest rate and low growth
economy, and it requires that those options are superior to the rate the Fed is paying on those reserves. 
Four years into quantitative easing, most of  the reserves that were created are still sitt ing in banks’
accounts at the Fed, costing it more in interest each round.  Unorthodox monetary policy will not work
where the rest of  the economic environment is not conducive to expectations of  good returns on loans.
Quantitative easing has also raised a number of  other concerns.  As with all expansions of  bank reserves,
the most serious danger is inf lation.  The combination of  interest payments on reserves and a dearth of
saf e investment opportunit ies in the market has led banks to accumulate massive quantit ies of  excess
reserves, preventing much of  the expansion of  the monetary base f rom entering the spending stream in the
f orm of  an excess supply of  money.  The Fed keeps pouring in liquidity but the size of  the vessel expands,
preventing reserves f rom spilling over into the spending stream.  This cannot go on f orever.  Should the
yields on alternative assets rise, perhaps due to a widening real recovery, and unless the Fed is willing to
raise the interest rate on reserves and the Treasury is willing to bear the cost, the drag coming f rom that
rate will be insuf f icient to keep reserves in the banks.
To some degree, the Fed wants those excess reserves to enter the spending stream, and to make up what
it is beginning to understand as a shortf all in nominal GDP, but the challenge will be keeping matters to that
much and no more.  Much has been made about the viability of  any “exit strategy” the Fed might have:  how
will it  get the excess reserves out bef ore they lead to inf lation?  If  it  cannot, inf lation may be a signif icant
problem down the road.
Wrapping up quantitative easing in 2014 is long overdue.  There are now more than enough reserves in the
banking system to support recovery, if  only banks were willing to lend them. In f act, the big challenge upon
ending QE will be the problem noted above:  how to avoid inf lation as the economy restarts.  Simply selling
back to the banks the assets the Fed has purchased won’t do the trick because many of  them remain junky
and are likely to be bought only at a major discount f rom the prices the Fed paid.  That dif f erence means
those re-sales can’t get out all the reserves the Fed has put in.  So while wrapping up QE is a necessary
start to avoiding the problem of  inf lation, f iguring out how to reduce the Fed’s balance sheet, which has
more than tripled since 2008, is the bigger challenge.
In addition, more attention will have to be paid to the real economy and the various f actors that are creating
the uncertainty that is making banks hesitant to lend and f irms unwilling to borrow and invest.  The reserves
are there, but economic climate is not conducive to the lending necessary to spark real recovery.
For now, QE continues to be mostly a way to bail out f inancial institutions with underperf orming mortgage
backed securit ies.  Fed purchases of  such assets have enabled banks and others to get these assets of f
their books in exchange f or reserves of f ering a very small but still posit ive rate of  return.  To that degree,
QE3 is a de facto bailout program, and does indeed need to be brought to a close.  In addition, the Fed’s
determination to keep interest rates near zero reduces the incentive f or households to save, which is the
opposite of  what is needed af ter the destruction of  so much capital in the housing boom and bust. 
Sustainable economic recovery requires real savings by households and a regulatory environment with
known, stable rules that f acilitate new investment.  The Fed’s policies of  the last f ew years have
undermined the creation of  just such a growth-producing environment.  
For more on these issues, see Steven Horwitz’s Mercatus Center publication An Introduction to U.S. Monetary
Policy.
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